Professor Gillian Black's Inaugural Lecture

Good  evening,  everyone. My  name  is  Laura  McGregor, Professor  of  Scotts  Law  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh. On  behalf  of  the  School  of  Law and  its  head  of  School  Joe  Shaw, it's  my  very  great  honour  to  welcome  you  to the  inaugural  lecture  of  Professor  Jilian  Black, Professor  of  Scott's  Private  Law at  the  University  of  Edinburgh. Jilian  has  had  an  interesting  and  varied  career, and  it's  been  a  real  pleasure  for  me to  see  the  many  accolades  that  Gillian  has received  most  recently  in her  appointment  as  commissioner at  the  Scottish  Law  Commission. Jillian  is  a  graduate  of the  law  school  at  the  University  of  Glasgow, graduating  in  1999  with  first  class  honours  and being  awarded  the  Bennett  Miller Prize  for  Excellence  in  private  law. This  is  where  we  first  met, Jillian  being  a  student  in the  first  Honours  seminar  I  ever  taught. Fortunately,  that  experience  doesn't  seem  to have  held  her  back  as  we  can  see  this  evening. After  graduation,  Jillian  decided to  go  into  legal  practise, completing  a  training  contract at  Shepherd  and  Wedderburn, and  working  there  as  a  qualified  solicitor. The  pool  of  academia  seems  to  have  been  strong,  however, because  she  returned  to  Glasgow  law  school as  a  teaching  assistant  in  2004. She  studied  for  and  completed  a  part  time  PhD  at Enburg  law  School  on  the  topic a  right  of  publicity  in  Scott's  law. I  distinctly  remember  that  Jilian  had  to  obtain special  permission  from  the  university to  submit  her  PhD  thesis  early. And  I'm  sure  you'll  agree  that  this  is  unheard  of, if  not  unique,  and  a  mark of  Gillian's  hard  work  and  her  dedication. She  then  moved  to  Enbro  law  School  to  become  lecturer  and senior  lecturer  before  taking  up  her  current  are  in  2020. The  long  list  of  Gillian's  publications is  testament  to  her  wide  interests. In  a  world  of  increasing  specialisation  in  academia, Jillian  has  mastered  different  areas  of  the  law. She  is  the  author  of  leading  books  and  articles  on, for  example,  contract  law, publicity  rights,  and  family  law. In  recent  years,  she's  dedicated her  time  to  her  role  as  law  commissioner. She's  the  lead  commissioner  on the  aspects  of  family  law  reform  project, which  is  currently  focusing  on civil  remedies  for  domestic  abuse. I  know  from  speaking  to  Jilian how  fulfilling  she  finds  this  work. It's  incredibly  important  for  academics  to  be  given the  opportunity  to  really  shape the  law  as  part  of  a  commissioner  role. Jillian  is  also  an  academic  associate  at Harcourt  Chambers  and visiting  professor  at  Napier  University. Now,  one  might  question  whether  she  would have  time  to  do  anything  else. In  addition  to  the  very  important  role of  being  Mum  to  Ewen  and  Roddie. She  has  nevertheless  very  interested in  Haldry  and  is  currently Ln  Ligo  perseverant  extraordinary in  the  court  of  Lord  Lon. Now,  because  of  recent  events, we've  seen  much  of  Gillian  in her  significant  duties  in  this  role, and  her  colleagues  have  enjoyed  watching  her  on  TV, for  example,  at  the  King's  Cronation. I've  emphasised  the  varied  and  interesting  nature of  Gillian's  career. There  is  a  theme  which  unites  Gillian's  work, and  that  is  simply  stated  equality, and  the  need  to  stand  up  for  those  who are  unrepresented  or  oppressed. The  work  that  Jillian  does  is  not  always  easy. It  takes  courage  to  speak out  on  the  issues  which  she  is  concerned  with. In  her  publications,  she  gives voice  to  those  who  may  otherwise  struggle  to be  heard  and  makes  us reflect  on  their  challenges  and  concerns. It  is  very  important  work, and  I  suspect  that  we  may  hear  more about  it  in  her  lecture  this  evening. So  I  would  ask  you  now  to  join  me  in welcoming  Professor  Jilian  Black  to  the  floor. I'd  like  to  thank  Professor McGregor  for  that  introduction. As  she  mentioned,  we've known  each  other  for  quite  a  long  time, and  she's  been  such  a  significant  and  generous  friend and  support  and  mentor. I  think  you've  had  the  single  most significant  impact  on  my  career, and  it's  an  honour  for  me  to  have you  chair  M  inaugural  this  evening. In  fact,  here  we  are. I  think  about  15  years  ago, when  the  Edinburgh  Centre  for  Commercial  Law hosted  an  annual  lecture, and  I  think  it's  lovely  to  see two  brilliant  legal  minds  there along  with  Lord  Hoffman  and  Lord  Reid. Now,  I  know  that  this  will  be a  memorable  occasion  tonight, full  of  entertainment  and  drama. There  will  be  highs  and  lows, you'll  laugh,  you  may  even  cry. All  of  that,  of  course  is  coming  your  way  at  8:00. But  before  then,  there's  this  lecture. A  fixture  which  I'm  pleased  to  say will  not  last  for  90  minutes. In  fact,  I  may  mean  to  stop  at  half  time, 45  minutes  in,  and  there  will be  wine  for  half  time  refreshments. It's  also  probably  appropriate  to  give a  content  warning  at  this  stage. I  can't  predict  whether  Scotland  will provide  an  emotional  roller  coaster  as  is  their  want. But  I  can  say  that  I  will  touch  on some  difficult  subjects  in  this  lecture, including  domestic  abuse  and  rape. I  will  try  to  do  so  sensitively, but  I  have  to  say  that  the  quotation  I  have  from Sir  Nicholas  Fairbairn  leaves  something  to  be  desired. But  without  further  ado, thank  you  all  so  much  for  coming. It  means  so  much  for  me  to see  so  many  friends  and  family  here  this  evening, from  across  my  career  in  law, from  my  undergraduate  days  at  Glasgow  Law  School, through  my  traineeship,  and my  time  at  Shepherd  and  Weerburn, and  my  supportive  and  welcoming  colleagues from  the  start  of  my  academic  career  at  Glasgow, and,  of  course,  my  fabulous  colleagues from  Edinburgh  as  well. And  some  of  my  students  past  and  present, including  from  the  Law  School  choir,  happy  days. And  I'm  also  so  pleased  to  be  joined  by colleagues  from  the  Scottish  Law  Commission  this  evening. Of  course,  along  with  fellow  heraldists and  officers  of  Arms, and  a  wide  range  of  those that  I  have  enjoyed  working  with, challenging,  collaborating  with  over the  course  of  my  academic  career. It's  also  very  important  to  me  to  have  family  here, especially  my  husband  and  sons. There's  nothing  like  working  in  family  law  to make  one  reflect  on  one's  own  family  life. And  I'm  sure  it  will  be  absolutely  worth  all  the bribery  that  was  required  to get  my  sons  here  this  evening. And  while  it  has  been a  great  pleasure  to  have  such  a  wide  ranging  audience, it  has  made  preparing  this  something  of  a  challenge. I  have  here  this  evening,  family  lawyers. I  have  family,  I  have  lawyers. I've  tried  to  cater  for  all  of  you,  but  do  wish  me  luck. In  fact,  in  preparing  this  lecture  and reflecting  on  family  life  and  family  law, I've  been  struck  by  the  very  great  privilege it  is  to  stand  here  at  all. Things  could  have  been  so  very  different. I'd  like  to  start  by  considering the  life  of  a  fellow  Glasgow  graduate. This  is  Edith  McDougall. She  matriculated  at  Glasgow  University in  1923  at  the  age  of  16. I  think  this  photograph  was  taken  a  decade  or  two  later. Fairly  young,  she  matriculated  at  16, and  she  studied  courses  in  English  language, English  literature,  French  and  British  history. She  graduated  in  1920  e  with  an  MA, second  class  honours  in  English  language  and  literature. She  was  by  no  means  one  of the  first  cohort  of  women  to  graduate  from  Glasgow. Women  had  been  graduating  there  in medicine  since  the  1890s. She  was  certainly  an  early  adopter,  as  they  say, not  least  because  she  took  an  honours  degree, which  was  much  more  unusual  100  years  ago. Studying  at  university  would  not  have  been a  typical  or  an  inevitable  path for  most  women  at  that  stage, and  especially  not  one  from  her  modest  background. But  I  think  one  reason  that  Edith  did so  can  be  found  in  that  family  background. She  was  the  youngest  of  seven  children of  Peter  and  Grace  McDougall, and  they  lived  on  the  West  Coast  of Scotland  at  Hunter's  Key  just  outside  Danon. Peter  McDougall  owned  two  grocer  shops. Here  is  the  one  at  Kern, and  such  was  the  family  commitment  to education  that  he  and  his  wife  put  six  of their  seven  children  through university  or  technical  college,  Edith  being  one  of  them. So  while  sending  your  children  to  university was  certainly  not  standard  practise  in  the  1920s, it  was  in  the  McDougall  family. By  1928,  age  21, Edith  had  graduated  with  her  honour's  degree, and  what  career  options  were  there? Well,  not  many  at  all,  primarily  primary  teaching. So  she  took  up  a  role  as  a  primary  teacher, as  indeed  did  her  two  sisters who  were  both  also  Glasgow  graduates. Now,  I've  honestly  no  idea  if she  wanted  to  be  a  primary  school  teacher. Perhaps  it  was  her  greatest  ambition. Or  perhaps  she  would  have  made a  different  choice  if  choices  had  been  open  to  her. And  even  then,  with  these  limited  career  prospects, there  was  another  barrier. In  1935,  she  got  married. Here  she  is  on  her  wedding  day  with  her  husband, Percy  Davis  on  the  steps  of the  University  Chapel  at  Glasgow. And  the  marriage  bar  meant  that  she  was no  longer  eligible  to  work  as  a  teacher. The  marriage  bar  for  teachers  was  not repealed  until  the  Education  Act  of  1944. Despite  the  fact  that  she  actually  had a  higher  academic  qualification  than  her  husband, he  had  a  bachelor's  degree  in  engineering, and  she  had  her  masters,  her  career  options  were heavily  constrained  and  then terminated  entirely  on  marriage. By  1935,  therefore, this  highly  qualified  and  intelligent  young  woman was  a  state  home  wife,  where  she  remained, becoming  in  due  course  a  state  home  mother  with the  arrival  of  three  sons  in  1936, 1939,  and  then  in  1941, she  gave  birth  to  her  third  son, my  father,  Colin  Davis. Sadly,  my  dad  passed  away  eight  years  ago, so  he  can't  be  with  us  this  evening. But  one  of  his  brothers,  Edith's  second  son and  my  uncle  is  here  this  evening. Like  my  grandmother  Edith, I  have  an  honour's  degree  from  Glasgow  University, and  I'm  very  proud  of  that  connection  between  us. But  the  difference  between  graduating  in 1928  and  graduating  in  1999  seems  stark. Admittedly,  I  also  ended  up  in  a  classroom, one  of  19  year  olds  rather  than  nine  year  olds, but  my  choices  were  not  constrained  by my  gender  or  by  marriage  or  by  children. The  differences  we  face  in  our  lives  become even  starker  when  we  turn  from  family  life  to  family  law. What  did  family  family  law look  like  in  the  1920s  and  30s? Well,  there  were  some  very  significant  developments around  this  time  in  relation  to  child  law, including  the  guardianship  of  Infants  Act  from  1925. Until  then,  the  father  had a  more  or  less  absolute  right to  the  care  and  control  of  his  children. It  could  only  be  denied  on  proof  of serious  physical  or  moral  danger  to  the  child, not  just  physical  or  moral  danger, but  serious  physical  or  moral  danger. But  the  1925  Act changed  that  and  required  the  Court  instead to  consider  the  welfare  of  the  child as  its  first  and  paramount  consideration. The  father  no  longer  had  an untrammelled  right  to  custody, and  this  is  a  major  shift. Also,  at  this  time,  adoption  was  not  legally  recognised, and  I  always  find  it  surprising  that  adoption  was only  recognised  in  law  less  than  100  years  ago. Informal  care  arrangements  were  not  uncommon,  of  course, but  there  was  no  way  that any  arrangement  could  be  recognised  in  respect  of the  child's  parents  in  law until  the  adoption  of  Children  Scotland  Act  in  1930, which  recognised  and  introduced  for  the  first  time, full  legal  transplant  adoption, which  we  still  have  today. But  my  focus  this  evening  is primarily  on  adult  relationships. So  my  next  example  comes  from the  sphere  of  marriage  and  specifically  divorce. When  my  grandparents,  Edith  and  Percy, got  married  in  1935  in  the  University  Chapel, divorce  was  still  regulated  by the  laws  of  Post  Reformation  Scotland. Here  we  go.  15  60, divorce  was  recognised  on  the  grounds  of  adultery  and  in 15  73  on  the  grounds  of  desertion  from  the  marriage. I've  illustrated  this  slide  with  a  photo  of the  panel  from  the  Great  Tapestry of  Scotland  showing  the  reformation. And  if  you've  not  been  to  Galahel, to  see  the  great  tapestry  of  Scotland, I  would  strongly  recommend  it. It's  fascinating.  So  here  we  have  the  reformation  panel. So  when  they  got  married, divorce  laws  had  been  unchanged for  over  400  year  nearly  400  years. There  was  a  very  significant  change just  three  years  after  they  married,  though, I  think  that  was  a  case  of coincidence  rather  than  correlation when  the  Divorce  Scotland  Act  was  introduced  in  1938. This  retained  adultery  and  desertion  as grounds  for  divorce  and  added  new  grounds. Here  we  have  them,  cruelty, incurable  insanity,  sodomy, as  it  was  referred  to  and  bestiality. Now,  I  confess  I  haven't  carried  out the  research  to  find  out  whether bestiality  was  a  pressing  social  ground  for divorce  in  the  1930s,  but  there  we  have  it. I  can  report,  however, that  though  the  grounds  for  divorce  were  extended, they  were  not  required  by  Edith  and  Percy, who  remained  married  until my  grandfather's  death  in  1974. Now,  I'm  not  going  to  talk  through the  evolution  of  family  law  1928-1999, but  there  were  a  number  of  important legal  and  social  landmarks. Oh.  Perhaps  most  importantly, was  this  development  in  the  1960s when  as  Phillip  Larkin  told  us, sexual  intercourse  began  in  1963, which  was  rather  late  for  me, between  the  end  of  the  Chatterley  ban and  the  Beatles  first  LP. I  have  to  say  I  was  slightly hesitant  about  using  this  verse  from Phillip  Larkin  because  of  the  risk  of tricky  questions  from  certain  elements  of  the  audience. I'm  conscious  having  my  sons  in  the  room. I'm  likely  to  be  asked  when  I  get home  what  exactly  an  LP  is. Of  course,  with  members  of  the  judiciary  present, it's  always  a  risk  mentioning  the  Beatles. So  for  the  benefit  of  Lord  Drummond  Young, they  are  popular  beat  combo,  I  understand. Other  legislative  reforms  which are  still  in  force  today  in  this  period, include  these  acts  here, all  hugely  important  and  have had  a  profound  impact  on  family  law  in  Scotland. This  takes  us  up  more  or  less  to my  own  graduation  in  1999, and  since  then,  there  have  also  been very  significant  changes  in  the  new  Millennium. The  first  change  that  I  want  to mention  is  the  Civil  Partnership  Act  of  2004, and  then  in  2014, we've  recognised  same  sex  marriage. Until  then,  adult  relationships in  law  had  been  very  clearly  heterosexual. Civil  partnerships  were  then  extended  in 2020  to  heterosexual  couples. Cohabitants  were  also  recognised  with the  Family  Law  Scotland  Act  of  2006, giving  the  right  for  a  cohabitant  to  make a  claim  against  a  former  cohabitant  at  the  end  of the  relationship  or  against the  former  cohabitants  estate  if the  relationship  ended  through  death. In  relation  to  children, there  was  reform  to  the  Children's  Hearing  Scotland  Act, the  Children's  Hearing  system  through  the  Act  of  2011, and  then  the  smacking  ban  was introduced  with  the  Act  of  2019, and  further  changes  imminent, not  let  with  the  Children's  Scotland  Act  2020, large  parts  of  which  are  eagerly awaited  to  be  introduced. We  also  look  forward  to  the  incorporation of  the  UN  Convention  on  the  rights  of  the  child, which  is  due  next  month. But  of  all  the  changes  since  the  turn  of  the  Millennium, and  perhaps  the  most  fundamental, I  think,  was  the  Human  Rights  Act  of 1998  when  it  came  into  force  in  October  2000. This  made  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights a  daily  reality  for  domestic  lawyers, and  for  present  purposes, it  put  Article  eight  and  the  Article  eight  right  to private  and  family  life firmly  on  the  agenda  for  family  lawyers, where  it  has  remained  ever  since  with a  radical  and  positive  impact  on  family  law. However,  though  Article  eight  is  well  used  by family  lawyers  in  the  context  of respect  for  family  and  private  life, it  has  also  shaped  privacy  laws  quite  dramatically. Now,  privacy  isn't  a  functional  right  in the  way  that  marriage,  civil  partnership,  divorce, or  parental  responsibilities  and  rights  are, but  it's  a  substantive  human  right,  which,  in  my  view, has  been  somewhat  neglected  in  the  field  of  family  law. So  in  the  rest  of  this  lecture, I'd  like  to  explore  family laws  relationship  with  privacy. I'd  like  to  start  by  providing a  brief  overview  as  to  why  privacy  is  so important  to  individuals  and  then  explore the  relationship  between  family  law  and  privacy. First,  privacy,  what  is  privacy  and  why  is  it  important? Well,  Daniel  Solov  has observed  that  privacy  is  a  sweeping  concept, and  it  encompasses  amongst  other  things, freedom  of  thought,  control  over  one's  body, solitude  in  one's  home, control  over  personal  information, freedom  from  surveillance, protection  of  one's  reputation, and  protection  from  searches  and  interrogation. Perhaps  unsurprisingly  for such  a  broad  and  sweeping  concept, privacy  can  be  conceptualised  in  different  ways, such  as  the  right  to  be  let  alone, the  right  to  control  access  to  your  personal  information, or  to  control  and  limit  access  to intimate  aspects  of  one's  life, including  intimate  relationships. Privacy  encompasses  many  different  facets, typically  all  revolving  around  control  and  autonomy. The  right  and  ability  to choose  what  happens  to  your  body, your  persona,  your  information. Professor  Sir  Neil  McCormack  has explained  just  why  privacy  is  so  important. It  protects  some  kind  of  desire  for  seclusion. This  desire  for  seclusion  should not  be  construed  in  all  cases  as a  desire  to  exclude all  other  human  beings  from one's  life  or  some  aspect  of  it. Rather,  it  is  a  desire  to  have  the  last  say  on  which other  human  beings  will  be  brought  within the  circle  of  one's  seclusion  for  certain  purposes. It's  this  control  which  is  so  fundamental. Intimate  relationships  are  built  on  trust, and  trust  can  be  achieved  by  sharing intimate  or  personal  information  or activities  within  a  select  circle, a  circle  of  seclusion. If  there  was  no  right  to  privacy  and  no  private  sphere, if  everything  was  under  surveillance and  publicly  broadcast, there  would  be  no  basis  for  trust  and a  reduced  scope  for  intimate  and  trusting  relationships, which  are,  of  course,  the  relationships  at the  very  heart  of  family  life  and  family  law. Privacy  is  a  fundamental  precondition for  human  flourishing. Only  by  having  control  over one's  private  information,  one's  body, and  one's  life,  one's  autonomy, can  one  live  a  good  life? And  we  recognise  this  more generally  in  law  with  the  doctrie  of  the  breach  of breach  of  confidence  and  the  information  privacy right  secured  by  Article  eight. So  a  helpful  reminder  of  what  Article  eight  says. The  right  is  stated  in  paragraph  one, ever  has  the  right  to  respect for  private  and  family  life, his  home  and  his  correspondence. The  exception  is  set  out  in  paragraph  two. There  should  be  no  interference  with this  right  by  a  public  authority, except  if  it's  in  accordance  with  law and  it's  necessary  in  a  democratic  society. And  it  lists  some  of  the  reasons  for  that. Interests  of  national  security, public  safety,  economic  well  being, prevention  of  disorder  or  crime, protection  of  health  or  morals, or  for  the  protection  of  rights  and  freedoms  of  others. Article  eight  encapsulates  privacy  rights in  the  European  Convention, and  I'd  like  to  turn  now  to  look  at how  this  interacts  with  privacy  rights. Privacy  pools  in  two  different  directions  in  family  law, and  I  think  this  is  one  of  the  problems  with  it. On  the  one  hand,  we  need  to  respect  the  privacy of  individuals  and  not  invade  that  privacy. What  can  be  more  private  than  one's  family  life, with  all  its  ups  and  downs, its  intimacies  and  confidences. Surely,  there  must  be  a  sphere  into which  the  state  does  not  intrude. But  on  the  other  hand, we  must  be  vigilant  and  ensure that  privacy  is  not  used  as  a  shield  by  those  who perpetrate  abuse  to  keep  abuse  behind closed  doors  and  victims  trapped  in abusive  and  hurtful  family  relationships. Privacy  should  not  be  an  excuse  for the  state  to  abandon  those  who  need the  protection  and  the  remedies  that  the  law  can provide.  So  we  have  this  tension. Privacy  should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  protection, but  the  law  should  not  invade an  individual's  privacy  unnecessarily. And  I'd  like  to  explore  these two  elements  in  more  detail. My  hypothesis  is  that  there's been  both  over  reliance  and  under reliance  on  privacy  with damaging  consequences  in  both  cases. Historically,  overreliance  on  privacy and  the  belief  that  the  family  is a  private  sphere  has  led  to  abuse and  victims  being  denied  protection  in  law. While  under  reliance  or  failure  to recognise  privacy  rights  has  led  to unnecessary  and  unjustified  invasion  of privacy  in  order  to access  rights  and  remedies  in  family  law. I'm  going  to  start  by  exploring the  overreliance  on  privacy, a  justification  for  the  state staying  firmly  out  of  family  life. And  this  has  had  over  time damaging  and  devastating  consequences for  vulnerable  family  members. Traditionally,  the  family  was  seen  as a  private  unit  and  one  in which  the  state  should  not  interfere. Within  that  family  unit, the  authority  of  the  husband  and  father was  unquestioned  and  unquestionable. His  rightful  authority  was  maintained  through  force. Society  was  therefore  centred  on the  ideal  of  subordinate  position  of  women  in  the  family and  of  the  right  of  men  to  dominate  and  control their  wives  and  children  by various  means,  including  force. The  role  of  privacy  in  facilitating this  has  been  explored  by  an  American  academic, Profess  Elizabeth  Schneider  in an  article  rather  tellingly called  the  violence  of  privacy. She  refers  to  an  American  case  from  1965, which  established  the  principle  of marital  privacy,  Griswold  against  Connecticut. As  she  says,  the  concept  of freedom  from  state  intrusion  into the  marital  bedroom  takes  on a  different  meaning  when  it  is violence  that  goes  on  in  the  marital  bedroom. The  concept  of  marital  privacy, established  as  a  constitutional  principle  in  this  case, historically  has  been  the  key  ideological  rationale  for state  refusal  to  intervene  to  protect battered  women  with  an  ongoing  intimate  relationships. Curiously,  when  this  case  was  being  decided  in  1965, a  young  woman  named  Brenda  Hale  was a  law  undergraduate  at  Girton  College  Cambridge. Sadly,  unlike  my  grandmother,  myself, she  did  not  have  the  benefit  of  Glasgow  education. But  despite  this  setback,  miss  Hale  persevered. Ultimately  finishing  her  career, as  we  know,  as  the  president  of  the  Supreme  Court. And  towards  the  end  of  her  time  on  the  bench, Lady  Hale  reflected  on  family  law  in 1965  when  she  had  been  an  undergraduate. And  though  remedies  for  domestic  abuse were  starting  to  emerge  at  this  time, she  observed  that  there  was  still a  strong  feeling  amongst  the  police and  other  authorities  that  it  was  wrong to  intervene  between  husband  and  wife. But  as  things  started  to  shift  in  the  1960s  and  70s, with  the  recognition  that  family  was  not a  private  world  with  a  husband  at its  head  as  the  unquestioned  authority, we  can  see  a  pushback  against  that  shift. For  example,  when  Scottish  women's  aid  started  to campaign  for  women's  refuges  in  Scotland  in  the  1970s, certain  politicians  were  firmly  opposed. Opening  women's  refuges  in  Scotland. Well.  They  are  playing  with fire  if  they  attempt  to  interfere between  a  husband  and  wife  in  this  way. Some  of  these  women  might  well deserve  the  batterings  they  get  from  their  husbands. Thank  you  to  miss  Scott  Walker  for that  radical  insight  in  the  guardian  in  August  1975. Over  in  the  Glasgow  Herald,  not  wishing  to  be  outdone, Sir  Nicholas  Fairba  I know  that  there  are  battered  wives  in  Britain, but  why  should  the  government  get involved  in  a  family  squabble? Abuse  of  women  and  children was  characterised  as  a  private  family  matter, a  squabble  into  which  the  state  should  not  intervene. Perhaps  the  most  troubling  example  of the  authority  and  the  rights  of  the  husband, which  were  supported  by  the  state,  upheld  by  the  state, was  the  doctrine  of  the  husband's immunity  for  marital  rape. The  law  as  set  out  by  Baron  Hume  in  17  97, recognised  that  on  marriage, a  woman  gave  irrevocable  consent to  sexual  intercourse  with  her  husband, and  therefore,  her  husband  could never  be  guilty  of  raping  her. Her  right  to  bodily  autonomy, never  terribly  effective  in  the  first  place, was  lost  entirely  on  marriage with  the  sanction  of  the  state. But  in  1989,  less  than  40  years  ago, the  High  Court  of  Judiciary, sitting  as  a  Court  of  Appeal, finally  paid  to  this  doctrine and  confirmed  that  there  was  no  longer a  defence  to  a  charge  of  rape  available  to the  husband  based  on  the fact  that  the  parties  were  married. Now,  I  find  this  case  staggering in  part  because  it  was  so  recent, but  also  in  part  because  of  the  arguments run  by  the  defence  counsel  for  the  husband, who  did  his  best  to  argue  that  the  law set  out  first  in  17  97  was  still  good  law. As  reported  by  the  Lord  Justice  General, Lord  Emsley,  counsel  for  the  husband, argued  that  there  has  been  no  change in  the  social  position  of  women, such  as  would  justify  subjecting a  husband  to  a  charge  of  rape  upon  his  wife. Any  changes  that  there  have  been  have  had no  bearing  upon  the  sexual relationship  of  a  husband  and  wife, The  biblical  view  that  a  husband  has  dominion over  his  wife  still  applies  in  1989. He  continued  outlining  the  allegedly  dire  consequences which  would  flow  if  marital  immunity  was  removed. As  he  said,  it  will  take away  from  women  a  number  of  basic  rights, and  I'd  like  you  to  reflect  on these  basic  rights  that  he  thinks  women are  entitled  to.  The  right  to  forgive. The  right  to  tolerate  and decide  whether  the  marriage  should  survive  or  not, the  right  to  change  her  mind. Fortunately,  the  Lord  Justice  General  Empy and  his  colleagues  were  not  impressed  with  this  at  all, and  in  holding  that  whether  or  not Hume  was  right  in  17  97, it  was  certainly  not  the  law  in  Scotland  in  1989, they  cited  with  approval the  leading  English  scholar and  jurist  Glanville  Williams. He  he  is  here.  He  said that  the  reason  traditionally  given  for the  general  rule  is  the  totally  unconvincing  one  that the  wife's  consent  is  given  on marriage  and  she  cannot  revoke  it. He  went  on  to  describe  this  theory  as an  authentic  example  of  male  chauvinism. That  at  least  was  consigned  to  the  history  books  in  1989. But  these  examples,  going  right  up  until  present  time, show  that  families  were  conceived  of  as a  place  beyond  the  regulation  of  the  state, where  the  husband's  rights  prevailed  over the  rights  and  autonomy  of  his  wife  and  children, and  the  home  was  a  private  domain  into which  the  state  would  not  and  should  not  pry. Now  men  also  suffered  under  this  regime, because  when  husbands  were  abused  by  wives, the  state  was  not  particularly  interested  either. The  patriarchy  was  firmly of  the  view  that  men  should  be  able  to stand  up  for  themselves  and  not  be  abused  by  their  wives. The  need  to  defer  to  the  privacy  of the  family  and  family  life was  therefore  highly  problematic. Returning  to  Lady  Hale, the  experience  of  domestic  violence  and  abuse  has taught  us  that  doing  nothing  is  not  a  neutral  option. Refusing  to  intervene  or  provide a  solution  legitimises  and sustains  the  power  of  the  abuser. But  the  good  news  is  that  things  have  shifted, and  the  work  of  Scottish  women's aid  and  other  individuals  and organisations  over  the  last  50  years has  produced  radical  change. It  remains  the  case  that  tragically, domestic  abuse  and  child  abuse  are  still an  all  too  prevalent  feature  of  life  in  Scotland, but  we  no  longer  refuse  to  intervene. The  sanctity  and  privacy  of the  family  is  no  longer a  reason  for  the  state  to  stay  out. The  police  will  now  investigate,  take  matters  seriously, pass  the  report  to  the  Crown  office, and  the  Crown  office  will  prosecute. In  relation  to  civil  remedies  for  domestic  abuse, there  is  still  work  to  be  done, and  that  is  my  current  project at  the  Scottish  Law  Commission. But  in  the  context  of  state  responses  to  domestic  abuse, I  think  this  quote  from  a  senior prosecutor  at  the  Crown  office and  procutor  of  Fiscal  Service  from  2018  is  instructive. M  Anne  Marie  Hicks  has  observed that  dealing  with  domestic  abuse has  always  been  a  matter  in  which  people  have  said  that there  is  a  danger  that  we  stray  into  family  life. Even  under  the  current  law, it  is  sometimes  asked  whether  we criminalise  normal  behaviours  in  a  relationship. We  do  not  a  minute, controlling,  frightening,  humiliating, degrading,  or  punishing  someone is  not  how  I  would  define  normal friction  in  our  relationship, and  once  we  get  to  these  boundaries, that  is  where  the  criminal  law  should  step  in. While  it  is  important  to respect  the  privacy  of  the  family, we  now  recognise  that  abusive  relationships  are not  normal  family  life  and  do  not  merit  protection. The  state  no  longer  holds back  from  so  called  family  squabbles. This  is  the  critical  element  in  all  the  examples  so  far. There  should  be  no  cloak  of  privacy in  the  marital  or  family  sphere  to protect  abusers  from  the  criminal  law or  to  deny  victims  a  remedy. Criminal  conduct  within  the  family justifies  the  intrusion  into  family  life to  protect  the  vulnerable  and justifies  any  invasion  of  privacy. No  matter  how  long  it  has  been  in  coming, it  is  undoubtedly  a  positive  step  that  at  last, privacy  no  longer  operates  as  a  lock  on  the  front  door, barring  the  state  from  entering. But  this  shift  concerns  criminal  and  abusive  behaviour. What  about  my  second  category? And  this  is  where  the  stat my  concern  is  that  the  state  compels  disclosure  of private  information  by  family  members  in  order for  those  family  members  to access  their  civil  rights  and  remedies. And  as  I  hope  to  show,  in  some  cases, this  is  very  much  an  unnecessary  invasion into  the  privacy  of  individuals. My  concern  is  that  access to  legal  rights  and  remedies  should  not depend  on  the  compelled  disclosure  of private  information  where  it's  unnecessary, but  that  this  has  never  been scrutinised  through  a  privacy  lens. I  think  one  reason  it's  been  neglected is  the  very  real  risk, as  we've  just  seen,  that  privacy in  families  can  be  dangerous. In  fact,  we  now  recognise that  privacy  can  be  dangerous  within  families and  there's  a  concern  that  by recognising  privacy  rights  in  families, we  run  the  risk  of hiding  abuse  and  allowing  abusers  to  stay  concealed. I  also  find  it  deeply  troubling, however,  because  of  the  inherent  hypocrisy  here, at  least  historically,  when domestic  abuse  and  child  abuse were  categorised  as  a  private  issue, where  the  state  should  not  tread, but  yet  the  courts  have  willingly, enthusiastically  at  sometimes  sens, scrutinise  the  most  intimate  details  of relationships  in  other  cases,  as  we  will  see. In  this  case,  the  privacy that  we're  concerned  with  is  primarily information  privacy  and  the  compelled  disclosure of  private  information  to  the  courts. So  for  Article  eight  to  be  engaged  to protect  those  privacy  rights,  we  need  three  elements. There  must  be  a  reasonable  expectation of  privacy  in  the  information. The  information  must  have the  necessary  quality  of  privacy, and  not  all  information  does  so. Disclosing  to  the  court  simply  that  you're married  does  not  engage  any  privacy  rights. The  first  element  therefore, is  this  need  for  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy, and  information  regarding a  person's  intimate  relationship,  their  health, sexual  conduct,  finances,  would typically  constitute  information  that  meets  this  test. There  has  been  specific  judicial  recognition that  sexual  behaviour  in  private is  indeed  part  of a  core  aspects  of  an  individual's  autonomy. The  second  element  is  whether the  disclosure  is  in  accordance  with  law. Actually,  I  think  this  is  at  the very  heart  of  my  concerns  here. The  disclosure  may  be  to  comply  with  domestic  law. You  may  need  to  disclose  in  accordance  with  law to  pursue  the  legal  remedy  that  you're  seeking, but  that  is  not  necessarily  in  accordance  with  the  ECHR, the  European  Convention  itself. I  would  argue  that  it's  potentially  the  law  here, which  breaches  Article  eight. However,  even  if  it  is  in  accordance  with  law, I  think  the  compelled  disclosure  of private  information  typically  falls  at  the  next  hurdle. It  has  to  be  necessary  in  democratic  society, and  it's  difficult  to  see in  the  examples  that  I  will  give  that this  disclosure  of  information  is  indeed necessary  in  the  interests  of  national  security, public  safety,  or  economic  well  being, for  the  prevention  of  disorder  or  crime, or  for  the  protection  of  health  or  morals. I've  highlighted  the  last  two,  as I  think  the  most  likely  candidates, if  we  could  manage  to  show  this  or for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  others. In  family  law  litigation, however,  there  is  another  issue. This  initial  invasion,  this  compelled  disclosure  of personal  information  to  the  courts  can  be  compounded  by a  further  invasion  of  privacy  interests  if the  court  judgement  is  published  and individuals  are  identified  in  that  court  judgement. Now,  one  of  my  other  strands  of  research  is on  transparency  and  privacy  in  the  courts, and  that  work  has  highlighted that  the  Scottish  courts  are  doing  their  best  to protect  litigants  privacy  by steadfastly  just  not  publishing  very  much  at  all. But  that's  the  battle  I'm  going  to  fight  another  day. For  now,  I  want  to  note  that  it remains  a  possibility  that  the  judge or  sheriff  could  publish the  judgement  in  your  family  law  litigation, thereby  disseminating  some  or all  of  the  private  information that  the  law  has  compelled  you  to disclose  in  the  first  place. An  individual's  privacy  interest can  be  harmed  through  the  invasion, the  compelled  disclosure  to  the  court, and  indeed  to  the  solicitors and  advocates  representing  you, and  then  by  dissemination, by  publication  in  the  case  report, and  both  these  breaches  are sanctioned  by  and  required  by  law. And  I  could  point  to  many  family  judgments where  deeply  personal  information is  disclosed  in  the  judgement, and  there's  no  guarantee  of  anonization. Indeed,  the  competing  interests  of transparency  would  suggest  that there  should  be  no  anonymization, and  I  have  a  lot  of  sympathy  for  that  perspective. The  courts  should  publish  their  decisions and  justice  must  be  seen  to  be  done. One  response  could  of  course  be  that  if  you don't  wish  to  wash  your  dirty  linen  in  public, then  don't  seek  a  remedy  through  the  family  law. You  won't  need  to  disclose  this  information  to the  courts  and  there'll  be  no  published  case  report. But  that  seems  a  slightly  disingenuous  response. The  law  is  there  to  offer  remedies, so  unhappy  individuals  should  be  able  to  seek those  remedies  with  no  unnecessary  barriers. At  its  most  fundamental, some  of  these  legal  actions affect  an  individual's  legal  status, and  there's  no  other  way  to  access  this. If  you  wish  to  end  your  marriage, divorce  changes  your  legal  status, and  it's  the  only  exit  from  the  marriage. There  should  be  no  obstacles  to accessing  these  legal  rights  or  remedies. I  think  it's  also  important  to  note that  privacy  is  a  fairly  sophisticated  concept, and  it's  possible  to  accept  that  someone  can  willingly choose  to  di  to  share  information  with  one  party, but  to  be  vehemently  against sharing  it  with  someone  else. That's  critical  factor  of control  at  the  heart  of  privacy. It  was  outlined  by  Neil  McCormack  in  the  quote  earlier. Privacy  is  frequently  about  choosing who  to  tell  and  who  not  to  tell. Family  law,  my  concern  is  often  removes  that  choice by  compelling  the  parties  to  disclose this  information  to  their  agents  and  the  court. In  the  time  available,  I'm  going to  set  out  three  examples  in the  context  of  adult  relationships.  To  sign  post  the  way. We're  going  to  start  by  looking at  divorce  and  disolution, move  on  to  impotence  and  finish of  cohabitation.  So  Divorce. The  Divorce  Scotland  Act  1976, we've  moved  on  since  the  Act  that  was passed  just  after  Press  got  married, rereno  n  to  the  sine  76  Act, and  it  provides  for  divorce  where the  marriage  is  irretrievably  broken  down. But  to  show  that  the  marriage is  irretrievably  broken  down, the  pursuer  must  establish  one of  four  facts  or  categories. Adultery  behaviour. They  need  to  show  that  since  the  date  of  the  marriage, the  behaviour  of  the  pursuer  or  the  defender. The  defender  has  at  any  time  behaved  in such  a  way  that  the  pursuer cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  cohabit  with  them. They  could  also  show  non  cohabitation  for  one  year  with the  other  party's  consent  or non  cohabitation  for  two  years. And  in  establishing  any  of  these  bases  for divorce  to  show  that the  relationship  has  irretrievably  broken  down, there's  a  potential  for  an  invasion  of  privacy. The  court  has  to  be satisfied  that  the  basis  is  established, it  therefore  requires  evidence  of  that  adultery, that  behaviour,  or  that  non  cohabitation. It's  highly  likely  that  some  or  all  of  this  evidence will  be  information  where  there  is a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy. If  you're  looking  to  prove  adultery  or  behaviour, you're  going  to  have  to  detail  the  relevant  conduct  of your  spouse  and  probably also  the  impact  it  has  had  on  you. Even  the  non  cohabitation  ground,  which  seems  innocuous, simply  that  you're  no  longer  cohabiting, could  require  the  disclosure  of intimate  information  about  the  parties. This  is  because  it's  possible  for  a  couple  to  be  non cohabiting  while  still  living  under  the  same  roof. The  relationship  may  be  over, even  if  the  parties  have  not yet  moved  into  separate  accommodation. Where  they  are  still  living  under the  same  roof  but  not  cohabiting, then  the  court  is  going  to  be  looking  for  evidence  that the  marriage  has  moved  on  from  an  intimate  partnership, and  that,  of  course,  will  require  evidence  of daily  living  and  sleeping  arrangements. Now,  in  reading  divorce  cases over  the  years,  whether  for  adultery, behaviour,  non  cohabitation, or  indeed  the  older  ground  of  cruelty. There  are  many  which  disclose deeply  personal  information  about  the  parties. But  the  example  I'm  going  to  share  is a  recent  decision  and  it's actually  from  England  and  Wales, Owens  against  Owens  from  2018. It's  a  very  rare  example  of a  divorce  case  which  made  it all  the  way  to  the  Supreme  Court, and  such  is  the  significance  of this  case  that  it  even  has  its  own  Wikipedia  page. Misses  Owens  became  something  of a  celebrity  in  family  law  circles, here  she  is,  along  with the  relevant  Wikipedia  page  in  the  background. But  I'm  not  actually  concerned with  the  legal  merits  of  the  case. I  want  to  examine  the  compelled disclosure  of  private  information. So  misses  Owens  petitioned  for  divorce  on  the  basis  that her  husband's  behaviour  was  such  that  it was  unreasonable  to  expect  her  to  cohabit  with  him. Sometimes  shortened  to  unreasonable  behaviour, but  the  family  lawyer  is  going  to have  a  discussion  about  that  later. Now,  Mr.  Owens  defended  the  action. He  objected  to  the  divorce. So  misses  Owens  then  had  to evidence  his  behaviour  and  the  impact  it had  had  on  her  to  show  why  it  was unreasonable  to  expect  her  to  put  up  with  it. In  an  attempt  to  meet  the  standard  required  by  law, misses  Owens  provided  details  of 27  incidents  from  her  married  life. It  was  accepted  that  these  incidents  were, in  many  ways  mundane, a  trip  to  the  pub  for  dinner  one  evening  when  Mr.  Owens sat  silently  with  his  head in  his  hands  refusing  to  speak  to  her. A  meal  out  with  a  friend  when  Mr. Owens  was  allegedly  critical  of his  wife  in  front  of  the  friend  causing the  friend  and  misses  Owens  embarrassment. Here's  one  of  the  most  detailed, labelled  as  the  airport  incident. It  took  place  at  Cancun  Airport. Mr.  Owens  reported  to  miss Owenes  that  he'd  seen  a  suitable  present  for the  housekeeper  at  the departure  lounge  of  Cancun  Airport. Misses  Owens  went  over  to  see  what he  was  referring  to,  but  could  not  find  it. So  instead,  she  purchased  a  silver  tortoise  necklace, which  she  knew  the  housekeeper  would  like. When  Mr.  Owens  found  out  that  miss  Owens had  ignored  his  suggestion,  he  lost  his  temper. He  raised  his  voice  so  that those  around  him  could  hear  him berating  miss  Owens  and snapped,  why  did  you  not  listen  to  me? And  he  demanded,  Why  did  you  not  buy  what  I  told  you  to? This  caused  miss  Owens  extreme  embarrassment  as  he was  visibly  chastising  her in  front  of  numerous  strangers. It's  perhaps  not  terribly  salacious. We're  not  really  in  the  same  territory  as  the  divorce  of the  Duke  and  Duchess  of  Argyle  in  the  1960s. But  Lady  Hale  and  the  Supreme  Court  recognised the  cumulative  impact  of  these  events  on  misses  Owens. As  she  said,  this  was  a  case  which  depended  on the  cumulative  effect  of  a  great  many  small  incidents, said  to  be  indicative  of  authoritarian demeaning  and  humiliating  conduct  over  a  period  of  time. Those  who  have  never  experienced  such  humilation, may  find  it  difficult  to  understand how  destructive  such  conduct can  be  of  the  trust  and confidence  which  should  exist  in  any  marriage. The  pinpricks  of  all  these  incidents  can add  up  to  far  more  than  the  sum  of  their  parts. I  would  suggest  that  this  is,  significantly compounded  by  being  required  to  disclose all  these  your  solicitor  and  then  in  court  and  then  have the  published  judgement  freely  available  online  for everyone  to  read  and  base  lectures  around. But  after  baring  her  soul, washing  her  dirty  linen  very  much  in  public, as  required  by  law  in  order  to  get  a  divorce, the  judge  at  first  instance, held  that  these  examples  were  just  part  and parcel  of  the  banal  reality  of  married  life, merely  examples  of  events  in  a  marriage,  he  said. To,  I  am  satisfied  that the  wife  has  exaggerated the  context  and  seriousness  of the  allegations  to  a  significant  extent. They  are  all  at  most  minor  altercations of  the  kind  to  be  expected  in  a  marriage. Now,  that  did  not  meet  the  statute  test  to demonstrate  the  irretrievable  breakdown  of  the  marriage, and  consequently,  he  refused  the  divorce. Despite  the  best  efforts  of the  Court  of  Appeal  and  then  the  Supreme  Court, the  judge  at  first  instance  had  not  erred, and  his  decision  to  refuse the  divorce  was  upheld,  rightly  so. The  couple  had  to  remain  married, not  living  together,  but  married. I  think  there's  something  very  troubling  about a  legal  system  which  compels  disclosure  of these  intimate  personal  details  of a  marriage  or  a  life  in  pursuit  of  a  legal  end, especially,  of  course,  when  there's  no  guarantee that  the  end  will  be  achieved. Is  there  a  solution  to  this? Well,  the  Scottish  Courts, especially  the  Court  of  session, have  developed  a  very  pragmatic  solution  which  works. In  divorce  cases  which  go  to  proof  on matters  of  financial  provision  or  child  contact, then  the  judge  will  typically  grant  the  divorce  in the  most  general  terms  before focusing  the  decision  on  the  points that  are  actually  in  dispute. Here's  a  recent  example  from  Lady  Wise. She  said,  so  far  as  the  merits of  the  divorce  action  are  concerned, on  the  basis  of  affidavit  and  oral  evidence  led, I  am  satisfied  that  the  marriage has  broken  down  irretrievably, and  there  is  no  prospect  of  reconciliation. The  basis  for  divorce  is  undefended  and  decree will  be  pronounced  when  orders for  financial  provision  are  made. In  fact,  she  doesn't  even  disclose  here  whether the  irretrievable  breakdown  was  evidence  on adulterate  behaviour  or  non  cohabitation. So  it's  very  discrete  and  it's  very  helpful. The  judge  explicitly  confirms  that the  statute  test  for  divorce  is  met, decree  can  be  granted, but  in  such  general  terms  that the  privacy  of  the  parties  is  protected, at  least  as  far  as  the  case  report. As  a  practical  solution, I  think  it's  very  neat,  but it's  not  perfect  for  three  reasons. In  the  first  place,  it  largely  relies on  the  divorce  itself  not  being  defended. If  Mr.  Owens  Scottish  cousin were  to  defend  a  divorce  action, the  judge  would  need  to  reach  a  decision on  the  merits  and  set  out  the  evidence. Secondly,  as  a  published  judgement  of  the  court, it's  slightly  problematic  for  those  of us  who  rely  on  judicial  precedent. It's  not  at  all  clear  what  the  facts  are  required to  prove  the  irretrievable  breakdown  of  the  marriage. So  practitioners  get  no  guidance  as  to what  standard  must  be achieved  or  what  evidence  must  be  led, and  academics  get  no  evidence  on  which  to examine  the  shifting  interpretation and  application  of  the  law. And  for  those  of  us  working  in  doctrinal  law, the  case  law  is  our  bread  and  butter. And  thirdly,  and  more  fundamentally  as  Lady  Wisner  is, she  has  properly  examined  the  written  and  oral  evidence. Although  she  respects  the  parties  privacy  by not  publishing  the  details,  nevertheless, she's  required  by  law  to  ensure  that the  irretrievable  breakdown  of the  marriage  has  been  established, and  the  intimate  details  of  the  breakdown,  therefore, have  still  been  disclosed  to  the parties  agents  and  in  court. I  have  heard,  perhaps  apocryphy, perhaps  not  of  one  sheriff whose  commitment  to  scrutinising the  evidence  in  divorce  cases  was such  that  he  once  demanded  that  the  solicitors  produce the  video  evidence  of  the  adulterous  conduct just  to  prove  the  adultery. Right.  My  concern  is  that  this is  highly  unsatisfactory  when  the  end  and  site, the  divorce  could  be achieved  without  any  infringement  of  privacy. And  I  think  this  is  the  key  point, without  the  need  to  couch  the  resulting  judgement  in vague  terms  and  without  the  need  to disclose  this  evidence  in  the  first  place. An  invasion  of  privacy  can  be  justified if  it's  necessary  to  achieve  the  legal  end  sought, but  this  is  not  the  case  with  divorce. It  doesn't  need  to  be  evidenced  by adultery  behaviour  or  non  cohabitation. So  in  my  view,  it's  not  necessary  to  compel disclosure  of  private  information in  order  to  grant  a  divorce, and  we  can  see  how  this  can  be done  if  we  return  to  England  and  Wales. Now,  this  is  the  happy  postscript  to  misses  Owen's  story. Just  two  years  after  she  concluded  her  legal  battle, unsuccessfully  in  the  Supreme  Court, Parliament  enacted the  Divorce  Disolution  and  Separation  Act. And  it  introduced  no  fault  divorce  in  England  and  Wales. Either  or  both  parties  to  marriage may  apply  to  the  Court  for  a  divorce  order, which  dissolves  the  marriage  on the  grounds  of  irretrievable  breakdown. That  application  must  be  accompanied by  a  statement  that  the  marriage has  broken  down  trievably, and  the  court  must  take  that  statement  as conclusive  evidence  and  then  make  the  divorce  order. No  need  for  any  further  evidence, a  statement  that  the  marriage is  irretrievably  broken  down. Divorce  can  now  be  obtained  in  England  and  Wales  on the  basis  of  this  statement  from  one  or  both  parties, and  the  courts  must  then  grant  that  divorce. No  need  for  a  future  miss  Owens to  go  through  that  painful  litigation. In  fact,  this  act  was  a  direct  result  of legal  campaigning  which  followed  on  from the  Owens  and  Owens  decision and  the  fairly  unusual  levels  of judicial  disquiet  which  were  expressed by  members  of  the  judiciary  on  the  back  of  that  case. Scotland  is  now  out  of  step  with England  and  Wales  and  indeed, with  much  of  Europe  in  maintaining fault  based  grounds  for  divorce, which  require  the  parties  seeking that  divorce  to  disclose  private  information. And  if  we  analyse  this  through  the  lens  of  Article  eight, I  think  it  cannot  be  justified. As  I  mentioned  earlier,  Article  eight applies  when  there's  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy, and  that  is  highly  likely  to be  the  case  in  a  divorce  action. The  disclosure  must  be  in  accordance  with  law. Now  my  argument  would  be  that  the  requirement  in  law for  that  disclosure  is not  in  accordance  with  human  rights, at  least,  but  any  invasion  of  the  privacy  would  only  be justified  if  it  is  necessary  in  a  democratic  society. My  argument  is  that  it's  very  hard  to see  how  the  disclosure  of  that  information  for divorce  is  necessary  in  a  democratic  society  when no  fault  divorce  is  perfectly  possible and  is  practised  in  many  European  countries. We  know  from  these  jurisdictions  that  divorce  can  be achieved  without  requiring  that  level  of  proof. Accordingly,  where  the  parties  are  required by  the  state  to  disclose  private  information  in order  to  get  a  divorce  and absolutely  fundamental  provision if  you  wish  to  exit  a  marriage, then  I  think  the  state  breaches the  parties  Article  eight  rights. For  completeness  and  for  the  family  lawyers  in  the  room, I  just  want  to  flag  up  that  there  is a  simplified  divorce  procedure  which exists  and provides  a  very  practical  solution, a  quick  route  to  divorce. It's  only  available  on  the  non  cohabitation  ground and  if  there  are  no  children  under  16. It  definitely  addresses  my  concerns  for those  who  are  eligible  to  use  it,  and  of  course, it  rather  proves  that  it  is  possible  to  frame divorce  practise  in  such  a  way  to avoid  that  invasion  of  privacy. But  it's  not  universally  available, and  as  long  as  non  simplified divorce  remains  available,  my  concerns  remain. Moving  on  now,  impotence. I  think  this  family  law  doctrine probably  provides  one  of the  grossest  invasions  of  privacy  in  Scott's  law. It  is  the  only  ground  on which  a  marriage  can  be  annulled. Marriages  may  be  null  and  void  for  various  reasons, but  they  can  only  be  annulled, set  aside  based  on  one  party's  impotence. We  have  a  definition  here  of  impotence. Professor  Clive  and  Sheriff  Wilson have  defined  impotence  as the  permanent  and  incable  ability of  one  spouse  to  have  sexual  intercourse  with  the  other. The  Common  law  doctrine  says  that  if a  man  and  a  woman  marry  and  it  must  be  a  man  and a  woman  because  impotence  has  no  application in  same  sex  marriage  or  in  any  civil  partnership, possibly  a  concern  in  its  own  right. If  a  man  and  a  woman  marry  and are  unable  to  consummate  the  marriage, then  that  marriage  could  be  set  aside. To  21st  century  eyes, this  level  of  scrutiny  from  a  committee  of mediaeval  Ladies  is a  very  curious  and  antiquated  doctrine. The  Scottish  Law  Commission  recommended  the  abolition  of impotence  in  its  1992  report  on  family  law, sadly,  not  yet  implemented  30  years  later. Obviously,  any  party  to a  marriage  who's  seeking  to  have it  an  nulled  on  the  basis of  impotence  has  to  bring highly  personal  and  private  information to  the  court  to  achieve  that  declarator. If  we're  concerned  about  an  invasion  of  privacy  here, then  one  response  is  to  point  to the  very  low  numbers  of  cases. Impotence  has  never  been  widely  used  in  Scotland. There  have  been  just  nine  decrees  of nullity  in  the  last  ten  years. But  arguably,  rather  than  suggesting  that an  invasion  of  privacy  is  not  a  significant  concern, these  low  numbers  suggest  that  the  doctrine  is  not  of any  practical  value  and  could  happily  be  abolished. Low  numbers  are  not  a  new  development. In  alienated  affections, doctor  Lea  Lenman  looks  at  divorce  and separation  in  Scotland  in  a  150  year  period  1684-1830. In  that  period,  she  recorded  six  cases  of impotence  against  904  of  divorce. Impotence  has  always  been a  very  low  or  infrequently  used  doctrine. The  Frank  evidence  she  cites  from  the  cases. I  feel  free  to  go  and  have  a  look  at  her  book, rather  Bridgerton  style  reading,  quite  frankly. One  wife  declared  that  her  husband  was  never  betwixt her  legs  nor  had  any  erection or  standing  in  his  privy  parts. And  reflect  in  contemporary  panic  of  witchcraft, another  wife  had  to  depone  that  she  had  not  used any  charm  to  make  her  husband  impotent. When  we  turn  to  the  cases  at the  end  of  the  19th  century  and  into  the  20th, there's  a  marked  change  in  language  to supposedly  more  scientific  assessment as  the  judges  examine  impotence  in  detail, considering  opportunities,  attempts,  medical  evidence, and  psychological  reasons  for failing  to  consummate  the  marriage. They  often  attributed  the  woman's  supposed  impotence to  her  invincible  repugnance  or  repulsion. These  cases  very  much  give the  lie  to  the  examples  in  the  first  half  of this  lecture  where  the  state  and politicians  were  reluctant  to  interfere  in  family  life. When  it  comes  to  impotence, the  state  has  been  more  than  happy  to require  the  courts  to  peer  behind  bedroom  doors. Anyway,  while  impotence  cases  rarely  trouble  the  courts, it  remains  the  case  an  action  for declarator  of  nullity  of  marriage  based on  impotence  must  be  one  of the  most  intrusive  civil  remedies  in  Scotland. But  so  long  as  we  continue  to recognise  impotence  as  the  ground  to  nulla  marriage, then  I  don't  see  any  way  around  this. The  disclosure  of  private  information is  required  to  prove  the  claim. Instead,  the  solution  would seem  to  be  to  abolish  the  doctrie, and  I  would  argue  that  the  invasion  of privacy  is  just  another  argument  to  implement. Finally,  those  recommendations  from the  Law  Commission  from  1992. My  third  example  is  from  cohabitation. Now,  I  did  a  Google  search for  illustrating  the  cohabitation. This  came  up,  and  it  says,  She's  near  your  wife. I  suspect  it's  probably  more  accurate  for  adultery. But  anyway,  it  came  up  for  a  search  on  cohabitation. We're  very  fortunate  in  Scotland to  have  legal  recognition  of  the  need for  a  financial  remedy at  the  end  of  a  cohabiting  relationship, where  one  party  has  suffered  economic  disadvantage. In  order  to  make  a  claim  under the  Family  Law  Scotland  Act  2006, the  parties  will  need  to  establish that  they  were  cohabitants, and  that  there  has  been an  economic  advantage  or  disadvantage. That's  the  current  law.  Reform  might  be  on  the  horizon, thanks  to  a  recent  report  on  cohabitation  from the  Scottish  Law  Commission  and  it's  currently with  the  Scottish  government  for  consideration. For  now,  however,  the  test  for establishing  that  the  parties  were  cohabitants  is set  out  in  Section  25 of  the  Family  Law  Scotland  act  2006. A  cohabitant  is  a  member  of a  couple  who  are or  were  living  together  as  if  they  were  spouses, and  in  determining  whether party  A  and  party  B  were  cohabitants, the  court  shall  have  regard  to the  length  of  the  period  in  which  they  lived  together, the  nature  of  the  relationship, and  the  nature  and  extent  of  any  financial  arrangements. The  judge  or  sheriff  will  need  to  be satisfied  that  the  parties  were  cohabiting  as  if they  were  spouses  and  to establish  when  they  stopped  cohabiting  as  if  they were  spouses  and  presumably  financial  evidence  as  well. This  can  lead  to  some  toe curlingly  awful  evidence  being  published. I  will  spare  you  the  worst  and  I  will  spare the  parties  by  not  naming  them  from  the  case  reports. In  one  case,  which  was  published  with  no  anonymization, fuel  details  are  out  there online  for  anyone  who  wants  to  see, the  details  of  the  cohabitation  came down  to  disputes  about  sex  and  plumbing. That's  not  a  euphemism.  There  was actually  an  issue  with  the  drains. As  the  sheriff  reported, the  defender  admitted  that the  pursuer  slept  with  her  on  Christmas  Eve, but  she  said  they  did  not  have  sexual  relations. The  pursuer  said  that  they  did. The  defender  stated  that  she asked  the  pursuer  to  stay  longer  because she  wanted  him  to  sort  out  the  drainage  problem. The  pursuer  denied  that  was  the  reason  he  stayed, but  accepted  that  he  did  deal  with  the  drainage  problem. This  evidence  reported  in  court, along  with  other  facts  of  their  life  together, allowed  the  court  to  reach  a  decision  as to  the  cohabitation  under  Section  25. Is  it  really  appropriate  for  these  details  and more  to  be  the  subject  of judicial  scrutiny  and  then  publication? In  fact,  reflecting  problems  with the  Section  25  definition,  Sheriff  Morrison, in  another  decision,  set  out a  handy  12  point  list  of  factors  that  could  establish, and  I'm  going  to  put  these  up  briefly  on  the  slides  now. The  length  of  time  during  which  they  lived  together, the  amount  and  nature  of  the  time  they  spent  together, whether  they  lived  under  the  same  roof, whether  they  slept  together,  and  separately, whether  they  had  sexual  intercourse, whether  they  ate  together, whether  they  had  a  social  life  together, whether  they  supported  each  other,  talked  to, and  were  affectionate  to  each  other, outward  appearances,  financial  arrangements, including  childcare,  intentions  of the  parties  and  physical  separation. Would  any  of  us  willingly  have  evidence  of  any  or all  of  these  12  points  of our  intimate  lives  discussed  in  court, the  subject  of  examination  and  cross  examination, and  then  potentially  set out  in  the  judge's  written  decision. Again,  there  is  potential  for considerable  intrusion  into  private  lives here.  Is  there  a  solution? Well,  the  problem  is, I  accept  the  court  must  be  satisfied on  the  evidence  that  the  couple  were  cohabiting. What  evidence  would  be  sufficient  to  establish  that? I  think  that  perhaps  in  this  case,  there  is  no  answer. How  else  can  a  judge  determine a  question  of  cohabitation  and then  compensation  for  economic  advantage  or disadvantage  without  the  disclosure  of  this  information? Whereas,  I  think  divorce  can be  achieved  without  disclosing any  private  information  so  that any  compelled  disclosure  is  a  breach  of  Article  eight, I  think  that  the  only  way  cohabitation  disputes can  be  resolved  is  through  the disclosure  of  this  information. Instead,  the  only  option is  to  try  to  respect  the  privacy  of the  parties  is  to  ensure  that the  information  disclosed  is  the  minimum  required. To  bring  all  this  together, I  think  it's  clear  that  privacy  has been  under  theorised  in  family  law, and  the  recent  impact  of  Article  eight  privacy  protection has  not  been  felt  within family  law,  as  I've  tried  to  show. For  too  long,  a  general  concept  of privacy  and  the  sanctity  of  the  family  unit  was used  as  a  reason  for  the  state  to  stay  out  of family  relationships  where  abuse was  perpetrated  in  households. While  simultaneously,  the  state invaded  and  continues  to  invade  privacy, particularly  informational  privacy by  compelling  the  disclosure of  private  information  in  order to  access  legal  rights  and  remedies. Without  a  clear  understanding  of  the  value  of privacy  in  family  life  and  the  balance  to be  struck  between  protecting  parties from  abuse  and  protecting  their  privacy  rights, both  these  positions  are  wrong  and  harmful. Informational  privacy  is  well developed  in  other  contexts. The  challenge  for  us  is  to  apply  that  understanding  in family  law  to  ensure  that  there  is no  requirement  to  disclose  information  to  achieve a  particular  legal  end  if that  legal  end  can  be  achieved  without  it. And  the  clerest  example  is,  of  course,  divorce. Reform  is  required  to  remove  the  need to  prove  the  breakdown  of  the  marriage, and  recent  reform  in  England  and Wales  shows  us  how  this  can  be  done. I  think  my  second  proposal  is that  doctrines  which  invade  privacy, but  serve  no  relevant  function  in the  21st  century  should  be  abolished, and  the  example  here  would  be  impotence. My  third  proposal  is  that  where any  disclosure  of  private  information  is  required and  the  courts  do  genuinely  need  that  in order  to  resolve  the  dispute  between  the  parties, then  the  emphasis  should  be  on minimising  the  invasion  to  ensure  that the  disclosure  is  necessary  in a  democratic  society  to  protect  the  rights  of  others. And  the  example  here  would  be  cohabitation. And  finally,  we  must  recognise categorically  that  privacy  can  never  justify  abuse. Criminal  conduct  should  never  be concealed  by  a  cloak  of  privacy. As  Elizabeth  Schneider  has  stated, we  should  aim  for an  understanding  of  privacy  in  families, which  is  grounded  in  equality, is  viewed  as  an  aspect  of  autonomy  that  protects bodily  integrity  and  makes  abuse  impermissible. It  should  be  based  on  a  genuine  recognition of  the  importance  of  personhood. This  would  be  a  far  more nuanced  and  sophisticated  approach to  privacy  in  family  law  than  is, I  think,  evidence  so  far. I  started  this  lecture  by reflecting  on  the  world  my  grandmother  lived  in  when she  was  an  undergraduate  and  the  changes  in family  law  over  the  last  100  years. And  I'd  like  to  finish  off  this  evening  by  returning to  her  and  by  completing  that  circle. I  was  only  four  when  she  died, so  we  didn't  have  long  together. But  here  we  are  outside  People's  Hydro. I'm  the  smallest  one  there  in my  red  dungarees,  along  with  my  big  sister, Denise,  who's  here  and  my  mother and  my  grandmother,  Edith. Thank  you  very  much  for  attention.